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FEDERAL CHARTERING
REVISITED
Donald E. Schwartz*
When talk of corporate reform became serious in the 1970s, a
number of critics sought reform through federal legislation.1
Some reform proposals were sweeping while others were more
modest, but they shared the view that Congress was the vehicle
for progressive change.
It is understandable that reform-minded critics thought in
terms of federal legislation. During the preceding ten years, Congress had addressed the most serious of social problems, adopting broad civil rights reforms, voting rights reforms, an environmental program; Congress even declared war on poverty.
By contrast, the state law of corporations lacked a focused
policy.2 In Bayless Manning's memorable phrase, state corporation statutes were "towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind."3 If reform was to be achieved, it would have to come from another
source.
Strong national leadership ruled the Congress, and it was able
to respond to the urgings of its senior leaders. The seniority system determined leadership roles, giving Congress a continuity
and institutional memory that it probably has since lost. Clearly,
things could happen in Congress that did not occur to state legislators to consider.
By the time scholars and practitioners of corporation law began debating the merits of federalizing corporation law, however,
* Late Professor of Law, Georgetown University. The author was a consultant to the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project described herein, but the views
expressed are emphatically his own, and not those of the ALL.
1. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974); Schwartz, A Case for FederalCharteringof Corporations,31 Bus. LAW. 1125
(1976).
2. State corporation law has traditionally been promanagement. Shareholders in
larger corporations typically are scattered geographically, and thus do not command an
effective voice in state legislatures. Hence, state statutory corporation law has tended to
grow haphazardly in response to management concerns. See generally infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
3. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
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national solutions to problems had lost much of their lustre.
Proponents of reform viewed the political process associated
with legislation as a threat to achieving a balanced solution.
Moreover, Congress appeared paralyzed when it came to acting
on any kind of meaningful corporate legislation.
More importantly, the merits of a federal solution to the
problems of corporation law were sharply disputed, and even
staunch proponents of reform had to concede that there was
much to learn before solutions could be reformulated. Furthermore, state courts, ready to assume a greater role in corporate
law, rendered important decisions that showed a better understanding of shareholders' problems."
The business community had reexamined the manner in
which it exercised its power, and managers initiated a number of
important reforms that had been at the center of legislative reform attempts. Thus, boards of directors became more professional, more critical, more attentive, and more independent.'
The forces of the marketplace, operating largely through hostile tender offers, furnished another reason not to legislate.6 No
more effective accountability mechanism was ever devised by
legislative crafting than the thrust of an unwelcome raider.'
This author, who had proposed sweeping federal legislation to
replace state corporation law for the largest of our corporations,
recanted8 after the American Law Institute (ALI) seriously began its Corporate Project. 9 I preferred the more informal efforts
of the ALI, working in its usual deliberative fashion, to the uncertain results likely to emerge from the hurly-burly of the political arena. Enough time remained to consider the need for fed4. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (holding that purchase
of minority shares in a cash-out merger was subject to an intrinsic fairness standard).
5. For example, larger public corporations began to establish audit committees to
monitor the selection and findings of the independent accountants. The audit committee
typically is composed of nonmanagement directors to provide an independent check on
management.
In the same vein, corporations began to be more conscious of duty of loyalty problems.
Procedures were established requiring approval of transactions in which one director had
a pecuniary interest by those members having no interest in the transaction. See generally Committee on Corp. Laws, Section of Corp., Banking & Business Law, Am. Bar
Ass'n, CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978).
6. See generally Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law and the ALl Corporate
Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1984).
7. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 77 (1988).
8. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 587 (1984).
9.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1984).
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eral legislation after the ALI's efforts had been completed and
state legislatures had a chance to study and respond.
I still enthusiastically support the ALI's efforts. I hope the final product is worthy of the enormous effort that its participants have already expended. One must remain on guard, however, with respect to the prognosis. I think that it is too early to
bury the idea of federal legislative reform as a concept or, perhaps, as the only realistic method for reforming corporation law.
At most, I think the idea ought to be tabled rather than
rejected.
Critics of corporation law have become increasingly alarmed
by a nationwide trend that seriously erodes standards of corporation law. This has occurred in the areas of greatest importance
to investors and to others concerned about corporate policy. The
areas most seriously affected concern the duties of directors, the
remedies available to shareholders for breach of those duties,
and the market for corporate control.
State legislatures have virtually eliminated liability for breach
of the duty of care. 0 To be sure, the subject was one of concern
and in need of reform. Draconian liabilities did not serve the
shareholder interest, but rather made courts hesitant to impose
liability. The result was a lowering of the duty of care standard.
When the Delaware Supreme Court, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,"
held that directors had breached their duty in approving a
merger in a manner the court regarded as ill-informed and
hasty, the result caused corporate managers and their counsel to
secure legislation in enough states to prevent the Van Gorkom
result from recurring. I do not intend to defend or attack Van
Gorkom, though surely there are situations where managers act
too hastily and should suffer liability. Where the recent statutes
apply, such liability is highly unlikely. These laws effectively
eliminate any kind of liability based upon a breach of the duty
of due care-in some cases, even where the conduct of the defendant director is reckless.
One may argue that there are sufficient market forces at work
to make it unlikely that directors will be so careless as to be
exposed to liability for the breach of due care, and responsible
scholars have urged that the law eliminate liability. 2 It is not
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35l(e) (West Supp. 1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1986); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
11.
12.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
See, e.g., Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983); Weiss, supra note 6.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:1

seriously argued, however, that liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty should be eliminated. 3 Nonetheless, recent developments seriously threaten this most fundamental of director and
officer obligations. Economic theorists argue that the corporation is essentially at the core of a nexus of voluntary contracts

and that stockholders are merely stakeholders who have contracted for certain entitlements." Under this approach, it is a
small step to allow the contracting parties to arrange their affairs and their expectations so as to eliminate liability for a
breach of the duty of loyalty, or at least to submit all disputes
concerning alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty to resolution
by means other than judicial determination. The theory might
further minimize the role of the courts, which have long stood as
a bulwark against unfairness in self-dealing transactions, for the
parties could contract the courts out of their traditional role."
Of more immediate and practical significance is the disquieting trend in the law to sterilize the remedy for breaches of the
duty of loyalty. 6 The stockholder derivative suit serves its most
significant function in providing a remedy for such defalcations,
and this is an area where market forces play a smaller role. The
derivative suit serves as the main deterrent against unfaithful
conduct.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in the 1981 case of Zapata v.
Maldonado,1 seemed to apply the brakes to a runaway force
that threatened to destroy the derivative suit. Other
courts-most notably the New York Court of Appeals in
13. Likewise, the case law remains unequivocal concerning duty of loyalty issues. See,
e.g., Production Finishing Corp. v. Shields, 158 Mich. App. 479, 405 N.W.2d 171 (1987);
Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities,94 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981).
14. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). But see Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clark,
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BusiNEss 55 (1985).
15. The contract approach would allow management to write contracts that would
prohibit or limit certain conduct in the event of a takeover attempt. It might be possible
to write a contract in such a way that it would not be necessary to obtain shareholder
approval in advance. Carney, ControllingManagement Opportunism in the Market for
Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 387.
16. For cases illustrating the trend toward diluting the effectiveness of shareholder
derivative suits, see Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988) (dismissing shareholder
derivative suit for failure to state facts which, if taken as true, would create a reasonable
doubt either of director disinterest or independence, or that the transaction was other
than the product of the board's valid exercise of business judgment); Kaplan v. Wyatt,
484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984) (granting motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit on
the grounds that a special litigation committee had previously found that the suit had no
merit and that it was not in the best interest of the corporation to proceed with the suit).
17. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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Auerbach v. Bennett,18-have allowed a board of directors to
terminate a derivative suit where the decision to do so is made
by an independent committee. The review is limited to an inquiry of the decision under the business judgment rule. Initially,
the cases in which courts sustained committee action terminating the suit involved only a breach of the duty of due care, but
this limitation was short-lived.1 9 Soon the corporate community
applauded the use of such committees as a device to cure the
abuses of derivative suits. The limitation, however, cured only
abuses by plaintiffs and threatened to render impotent a crucial
check on management discretion.
Zapata held that the business judgment rule did not apply to
the determinations of the committee in the case before it and
offered many sound policy reasons for this result. The court determined that the case before it was one in which a demand on
the directors was not required. In dictum, the court mentioned
that if a demand were required, then the decision of a committee would be upheld unless it was "wrongful."20 Thus, the business judgment rule was considered the appropriate standard in a
"demand required" case, an issue not necessary to the resolution
of the case.
Subsequently, Delaware decided Aronson v. Lewis,2 1 in which
demand was required of a shareholder in a case involving a selfdealing transaction by a person who owned forty-seven percent
of the stock of the corporation. The court reasoned that demand
was necessary because the directors to whom demand would be
addressed were persons not threatened with liability unless they
themselves were unprotected by the business judgment rule.
This being the case, the decision not to proceed with the suit
would be judged under the business judgment rule. The irony is
striking. If the suit were judged on its merits, the self-dealing
transaction with the dominating shareholder would not be
judged on the basis of the business judgment rule. But the court
never reaches the merits, because of the need to make a demand,
the denial of which is then judged under the business judgment
rule. So much for the standard of fairness in a self-dealing transaction. Further impairing the plaintiffs remedy was the Zapata
court's determination that whether a plaintiff would be entitled
18.
19.
20.
21.

47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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to some discovery regarding a committee's decision not to sue is
a matter of discretion for the trial court.22
The combination of these forces again threatens the derivative
suit with practical extinction unless legislatures, or the ALI, can
rescue it. There seem to be few advocates for a legislative solution. State corporate legislation is largely influenced and instigated by association committees composed mainly of corporate
lawyers whose clients would find reform anathema, and who
themselves have long become conditioned to their clients' point
of view.2 3
Finally, there is the tender offer.24 A tender offer means many
things in our corporate society. Inefficient management can be
replaced with more efficient, responsible, and innovative management. Opportunistic corporate swashbucklers can make quick
profits from largely unproductive activity. Bankers and lawyers
can make obscene profits. Corporations can be broken up into
various pieces, sometimes making them leaner and tougher, and
at other times making them dangerously vulnerable. Our economy can become highly leveraged, which can result in greater
efficiency or dangerous overextension. Shareholders of target
companies can reap great profit. In the aggregate, a tender offer
is all of these things and more. In view of its multifaceted nature, the tender offer ought not to be seen as uniformly beneficent or evil.
Perhaps the worst legislative approach to tender offers is the
adoption of a one-dimensional viewpoint about their desirability. As a practical matter, this means that the worst kind of legislation imposes barriers against a tender offer and sides with
the viewpoint of corporate management, which for obvious selfprotective reasons opposes the very institution of the tender offer. One-sided legislation to foster tender offers is equally offensive, but is a myth. Federal legislation in this area, as reflected
in the Williams Act, 23 refrained from passing judgment on the
virtue of tender offers, but instead required full disclosure and
prohibited the worst features of tender offers. By not taking a
viewpoint in favor of or against tender offers, Congress subtly
22. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del.
1985); Levine v. Smith, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 93,581 (Del. Ch. 1987).
23. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 514 (1985).
24. For an article discussing the tender offer as a tool for corporate governance, see
Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance,84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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expressed its view that the institution of the tender offer occasionally had value.26
State laws responded to a different constituency, and states
enacted statutes with little deliberation or debate.2 7 In any
event, public attitudes regarding tender offers (except for the attitudes of shareholders) turned hostile. It was not difficult to
portray voracious raiders as greedy, Boesky-like vultures who
ought to be stopped. A significant restraint on the states, however, appeared to be the Constitution. The Supreme Court in
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,2 8 in 1982, found that a state tender offer
statute unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce
because tender offers were nationwide transactions exceeding
the legitimate concerns of the particular state. That restraint
was largely removed by the 1987 decision of the Supreme Court
in CTS Corporationv. Dynamics Corporation.2 The CTS Court
indicated that there was much greater latitude for the states to
enact legislation that would have the practical effect of restraining or perhaps eliminating hostile takeover bids.30 First,
CTS permitted states to copy the Indiana statute that was upheld in CTS. Second, CTS encouraged states to legislate more
potent antitakeover devices.3 1 A majority of states now have
antitakeover laws, most of which were adopted hastily and, in
32
many cases, at the urging of a particular target company.
This trend has seriously impaired the utility of the tender offer as a device to make management more accountable to shareholders. This development and the developments discussed pre26. See Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
27. For example, Dayton Hudson Corporation, one of the largest employers in Minnesota, was able to convince the state legislature to pass speedily an antitakeover law in
response to a hostile tender offer by the Dart Group. Dayton Pushes Takeover Law,
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1987, at D5, col. 6.
28. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
29. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
30. For commentary on the decision, see Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the
Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 101 HARv. L. REV. 96 (1987); Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987).
31. In fact, many states have enacted more stringent antitakeover statutes since the
CTS case was decided. See Lawrence, Post CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America: A Comparison of Reforms in State Control Share Acquisition Laws, (National
Conference of State Legislatures 1987).
32. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201, 10-1211-1217 (Supp. 1988) (extending
jurisdiction under post-CTS control-share statutes to nonresident corporations); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.109-10 (West Supp. 1988);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 110D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. Delaware and New York are notable exceptions in that they acted
deliberately.
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viously have made shareholders dangerously vulnerable to
underperforming or greedy managers. While managers like to
point to tender offers and lawyers as the source of American
noncompetitiveness in world markets, this claim lacks the ring
of truth. In fact, a good claim can be made that keeping managers insecure and on edge enhances American competitiveness. 3
A related trend in new legislation has been to establish an array of factors that boards may consider in evaluating the best
interests of the corporation. These statutes typically allow for
consideration of political, economic, and social factors, including
effects of corporate action on employees, suppliers, customers,
and the community in which the corporation is located. Although courts have reasoned that these elements may be valid
considerations, enabling directors to meet their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders, tribunals have given weight to these
factors only where there is an ultimate benefit to shareholders.
Further, while these factors may be relevant from a community
relations standpoint, they make it difficult to evaluate directors'
conformance to the duty of loyalty to shareholders, particularly
in the tender-offer context. Absent these statutes, the issue of
loyalty could be seen as an inquiry about whether the decision
maximized shareholder values. As it stands, these statutes may
allow directors to cloud the issues.
For progressive critics of the corporation, the newly enunciated standard poses a dilemma. On one hand, they would be expected to favor permitting directors to consider the effect of corporate action on the community as a whole-although they
believed such power already existed. On the other hand, one
doubts whether management sheds crocodile tears for the community, and suspects rather that management seeks only to preserve its position of power-a task made easier by a dilution of
its duty to the shareholders. In any event, the newer statutes
may surrender too much control over the managers without any
clear articulation of how managers can be all things to all
people.
Thus, the case for corporate reform today seems at least as
strong as it did in the early 1970s, if not stronger. Moreover, the
tide of events that has accelerated the dangers threatens to overwhelm the ALI's worthwhile efforts to put reform on a firm, not
33. Takeover Tactics and Public Policy, 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2371 Before the
Subcomm on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess; 183-99 (1984) (statement of Carl
Icahn, President and Chairman, Icahn & Co.).
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legislated, footing. For example, it is highly unlikely that the
ALI can reverse the trend of exculpating directors from liability
for breach of the duty of due care. The efforts of a private, selfselected group of lawyers, judges, and academics may be simply
too weak to withstand the force of an enacted statute. The ALI
effort is more likely to be influential with respect to judge-made
law, such as the rules that have surrounded derivative suits;
even there, however, the restrictions on derivative suits may be
incorporated into legislation as a result of possible changes in
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.
The ALI effort began on an aggressive and strident tone. In
fact, in its earliest descriptions of governance reform and the
business judgment rule, the ALI was needlessly hostile and not
sufficiently mindful of the sensitivities and viewpoint of the corporate community. That changed as the Project matured. The
later versions of Parts III and IV, dealing with corporate structure, and with the duty of due care and the business judgment
rule respectively, were balanced and were overwhelmingly endorsed by the members of the ALI. Similarly, Part V, dealing
with the duty of fair dealing, including the duty of loyalty, was
tentatively approved by a wide margin.
As the Project began to deal with more controversial areas,
such as derivative suits and transactions in corporate control,
the governing body of the Institute, its Council, grew more cautious and less receptive to the views of its reporters. Consequently, far more modest reforms are likely to emerge from the
final product of the Project than once appeared to be the case.
There are varied explanations for this. At one end of the spectrum, the reporters may have been wrong, and the Council may
have corrected them. At the other end, the Council may have
lost its vigorous desire to support reform.
Some knowledge of the origins of the ALI Project and its subsequent development is necessary to understand what has transpired. The ALI decided in 1978 to undertake the Project at a
time when the SEC placed corporate governance high on its
agenda and when members of Congress were urging and drafting
federal legislation. The prospects of a federal role in corporate
affairs appeared real. With the election of President Reagan in
1980, that was no longer the case. Consequently, in the early
1980s, when the Project began to show results which to a large
extent would have been those predicted in 1978, political tempers had changed. Those who had favored an ALI Project in
preference to federal legislation, and used the ALI Project in
preference to federal legislation, now saw no need for any reform
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effort at all. If it was too late to eliminate the Project entirely,
there was still time to weaken it and attack its particular
recommendations.
Another ironic development occurring in the 1980s makes federal legislation a more tenable thought. Corporate managers,
who argued strenuously against legislation in the 1970s, now
favor federal legislation that would serve an important interest
of theirs-deterring hostile tender offers. Thus, the advisory
group on tender offers, established by the SEC in 1983, recommended federal legislation to address certain tender-offer practices, such as greenmail payments. s ' Others have urged federal
legislation that would intrude into traditional state-law areas in
order to facilitate defenses against tender offers. These one-time
opponents of federal legislation who opportunistically favor selective federal laws should scarcely be heard to complain about
the principle of federal legislation in the corporate area on
grounds that this is no place for Congress to be, a position that
the business community vigorously argued in the 1970s.
In July 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission
adopted rule 19c-4, its so-called "one share, one vote rule.""5
This is a complex conpromise rule that limits the ability of companies to adopt a two-tier voting structure that would curtail the
voting power of publicly traded stock. The context of adoption
was the rejection of a proposed amendment to the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules that would abrogate the longstanding requirements that all common stock listed on the Exchange have full voting rights. Because neither the American
Stock Exchange nor NASDAQ imposed such a requirement, the
NYSE sought to stop the erosion of listing by its constituencies
as they attempted to erect a defense against hostile tender offers. The NYSE board did not believe that they alone should be
left holding the flag for corporate democracy.
The complexities and exact nature of the compromise need
not detain us. What is worth observing is that the nature of this
problem, certainly at first glance, is essentially one of corporate
control and corporate governance for which the traditional solution lies with the state legislatures. That is where the voting
rights of shareholders are determined; that is where flexibility of
assigning the rights of shares is fixed.
34. ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS, SEC, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1983).
35. Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, 25, MIA [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 84,247
(July 7 and 13, 1988).
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The Commission held an extraordinary open meeting on July
7, 1988, to consider the rule, and adopted it by a 4-1 vote.3 6 One
striking feature of that meeting is that the public statements of
each of the commissioners included a strident disclaimer that
approval of this rule signified embarking on a path of federal
chartering of corporations. Each commissioner renounced that
as an objective or an effect of the adoption of the rule. Nonetheless, each commissioner who approved the rule must have realized that no state, much less all the states, could as a practical
matter adopt such a law, nor could any single self-regulatory organization (SRO). To achieve the objective the Commission
deemed worthy required the SEC itself to adopt a rule or to
amend the rules of the SROs to deal with the practice. Thus, the
Commission recognizes the need for a federal role in the governance of the corporation, albeit reluctantly, and surely does not
embrace widespread federal intervention.

CONCLUSION

The protections that corporation law provided to shareholders
and to our economic community against the excesses and complacency of corporate directors and managers have undergone a
general weakening. Although it is uncertain whether the ALI can
accomplish effective and meaningful reforms, this effort may be
the most important attempt by the corporate community to reform itself.
ALI reform efforts are superior to legislative reform efforts because current federal legislation is likely to be less sweeping
than the chartering proposals that were advanced in the 1970s.
If Congress is called upon to act, it will perhaps find it preferable to pursue Professor Cary's approach of dealing with specific
problems rather than the entire subject. 37 It is impractical to expect Congress to do more; even this task is formidable. Legislative reform will require support and agreement from principal
Congressional leaders and the SEC-as well as considerable support from the private sector-to stand a chance of passage. Most
important, a change in the political climate must occur, but that
is known to be cyclical.
36. Open Meeting of the Securities Exchange Commission, July 7, 1988 (copy of tape
available from the Office of the Secretary of the Commission).
37. Cary, supra note 1, at 696-705.
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The final returns are not in. At best, the ALI project is several
years away from completion. What is necessary in the time remaining for its completion is that the Institute recognize the discouraging trend in corporate law and reaffirm the basic standards of loyalty, prudence, and accountability, all of which are
under severe attack. If the private sector cannot achieve these
reforms, reformers will be forced to rely on the-unpromising alternative of Congressional reform.

